Abstract
for the RCE
Bacillus
anthracis Host
Interactions
Discovery
of Subunit Vaccine Candidates against
Glanders
Alphavirus
Vaccines for Biodefense
Novel
Genetic Tools for Viral Biodefense
Development
and Evaluation of Human
Brucellosis
Vaccines
Rapid
Diagnostic Tools for Q Fever
New
Diagnostic Methods for Accute Rickettsial
Infections
Risks
and Interventions for Pandemic Influenza
Development
of Novel Pseudoinfectious Flavivirus Vaccines
Development
of Diagnostic Reagents for the detection
of
Francisella and
Francisella
Infection
Toward
Control of Rift Valley Fever Virus
Replication
Novel
Vaccine Technology for Biodefense
Nucleocapsid-specific
Small Molecule Inhibitors
of
the Bunyaviridae
New
Technologies for Creating Affinity Reagents
New Opportunities Projects
Identification
and Characterization of Novel
Flavivirus
Antivirals
Biosafety
Containment Training Program
Passive
Immunotherapeutics for
Select
Agents
Preclinical
Testing of YF17D/LAS, a Bivalent
Vaccine
for Lassa and
Yellow
Fever
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Risks
and Interventions for Pandemic Influenza
Collaborating
Institution: University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston
(UTMB), Galveston, TX
Principal
Investigator: Norbert Roberts Jr., MD
Co-Investigators:
a)
Erich Hoffmann, PhD – St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital,
Memphis, TN
b) Joan Nichols, PhD – UTMB, Galveston, TX
c) Michael Holbrook, PhD – UTMB, Galveston, TX
d) Robert Webster, PhD – St. Jude Children’s Research
Hospital, Memphis, TN
Expected
Product: Therapeutics and vaccine candidates for the treatment
and prevention of pandemic influenza.
Description: A future natural influenza pandemic is inevitable, and the risk
appears to be very high at the current time because of the widespread
avian influenza outbreak. Direct infections of humans has occurred
in countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East since 2004,
with >58% mortality for the documented human cases. The H5N1
avian virus has spread throughout Asia in poultry populations.
There is increasing concern that the widespread outbreak of avian
H5N1 in Asia will lead to co-infection of humans concurrently
infected with human H1N1 and H3N2 strains, resulting in reassortant
virus strains that can accomplish human-to-human spread and initiate
the next influenza pandemic, with increased mortality (even if
not fully 58%) for those infected.
Information regarding the potential avian–human reassortant
combinations is key to establishing pandemic preparedness, including
assessment of susceptibility of the likely strains to licensed
or developmental antiviral agents, and identification of the most
important reassortant strains for targeted vaccine development.
The hypothesis to be tested is whether human (H1N1 or H3N2) and
avian H5N1 influenza virus genes are compatible and have the potential
to generate a pandemic influenza virus. The available information
would suggest that this should be very likely but we do not know
if it is possible since not all influenza gene combinations are
necessarily compatible. The specific aims of this project are to:
(1) determine the potential for reassortment to occur between current
human (H1N1 or H3N2) influenza viruses and an avian H5N1 influenza
virus from a human case of infection in Vietnam and/or Indonesia;
(2) determine if the resultant reassortant viruses are pathogenic
in embryonated chicken eggs and mammalian cells, including human
leukocytes; (3) determine if the resultant reassortant viruses
are infectious for mice without adaptation and to determine whether
they are highly pathogenic for the mice; and (4) determine if the
resultant reassortant viruses are susceptible to current antiviral
agents, such as the licensed neuraminidase inhibitors, or agents
in development.
The studies represent a collaborative effort of investigators from
the University of Texas Medical Branch and St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital who have expertise most relevant to the studies.
The studies would use high biocontainment facilities at both institutions
(BSL4 and BSL3-enhanced, respectively) as well as analyses of cells
and viruses, rendered (and assured to be) non-infectious, in BSL2
laboratories at both institutions.
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